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INTRODUCTION.
e relationship between the African Union (AU) and China has arguably become closer in 
the last few years. In 2015, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established a diplomatic 
mission to the organisation, the third after the US and the EU, as part of its eort to move 
beyond bilateral mechanisms, which have traditionally been the preferred channel for 
Sino-African relations. So far, China has mostly worked with the AU Peace and Security 
Council on maintaining peace and security on the continent. However, in dealing with the 
AU, Beijing has encountered a series of challenges which are partly inherent in the 
organisation itself, and partly arise from the peculiarities of Chinese diplomacy, which relies 
heavily on government-to-government ties. 
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THE AFRICAN UNION: AN OVERVIEW.
In the post-Cold War era, when Western powers shifted their attention from Africa to 
Eastern Europe and Asia, the UN, overburdened by requests to intervene in continental 
conicts, started calling for increased regional engagement. e Organization of African 
Unity (OAU), which had been expected to respond to these needs, was not able to provide 
strong leadership nor take any signicant action to address any of these conicts, mostly due 
to institutional and structural weaknesses. When the OAU was succeeded by the AU in 2002, 
its principal aim was to perform the tasks that the OAU had not been able to handle. Its 
Constitutive Act supported maintenance of the status quo by upholding the principles of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its member states, although it presents 
more elaborate features than the OAU Charter. Such features include: the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC), the standing organ for the prevention, management, and resolution of 
conicts; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), in charge of providing the 
Chairperson of the Commission with relevant information on potential conicts and threats 
to peace; the African Standby Force (ASF), which operates at the continental, sub-regional, 
and state level through ve regional brigades of around 4,300 troops; and the Panel of the 
Wise (PoW), which is composed of ve members, representing Africa’s ve sub-regions 
(North Africa; East Africa; Southern Africa; Central Africa; and West Africa) and is in charge 
of preventive diplomacy and peace making. Furthermore, eight regional economic 
communities (RECs) were established with the Abuja treaty in 1991 and constitute not only 
key building blocks for economic integration in the continent, but also essential actors in 
maintaining peace and stability in their respective regions. While these are all important steps 
in the AU’s eorts to maintain peace on the continent, and while the PSC’s determination to 
forestall frequent unilateral intervention from foreign actors is laudable, the reality of 
post-colonial conicts in Africa means a lot more work needs to be done. To date, the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) still faces a series of political and technical 
challenges, and the AU struggles to build eective conict-resolution and post-conict 
reconstruction mechanisms. Sovereignty still represents a central and very contested element 
in African security, and it is often instrumentalised by governments that fail to provide 
security, welfare, and development for their peoples.
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WHAT ROLE FOR CHINA?
Built in 2012 at a cost of US$200 million, the new AU headquarters are a symbol of 
China-Africa ties. A recent report by Le Monde accused the PRC of data theft, and although 
the accusations have been ercely denied by both Chinese and African ocials, the incident 
prompts a reection on the role China has been playing in the continent’s peace and security. e 
construction of the AU building is only one of the many contributions China has made to 
the AU in the last few years. During the latest Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held in 
2015, President Xi Jinping committed US$60 million in free aid to the AU to support the 
building of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to 
Crisis. In 2016, China donated US$1.2 million towards peace eorts in Somalia through the 
AU peacekeeping operation (AMISOM). Furthermore, the establishment of a dedicated PRC 
diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa in 2015 reects an awareness of the need for a permanent 
link to the organisation. During the 7th China-AU strategic dialogue held in Beijing in 
February 2018, an invitation to establish an AU representative oce in China was renewed.
Yet, cooperation between the AU and China is complicated by a number of issues, some of 
which are inherent in the AU, while some are due to China’s diplomatic tradition in Africa. 
As for those inherent in the AU, rstly, many AU member states do not usually pay their 
annual dues, so that most of the AU’s funding still comes from external donors, including the 
EU and the UN. According to its latest nancial statement, 61.7% of the nancing came 
from outside of the continent in 2015. is makes the body dependent on external partners, 
a fact which has limited its eectiveness in decision-making, as well as brought the autonomy 
of its agenda into question. Secondly, in 2015 it was decided that six countries—South 
Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, and Libya—should increase their nancial 
contributions because their economic situations were healthier than most African 
counterparts. ese six countries alone had been expected to cover 60% of the entire AU 
budget starting from last year. is, in turn, raised doubts that the AU’s priorities might be 
decided by this small faction of countries pursuing their own national interests. Indeed, so 
far, the AU seems to have failed to promote unity and solidarity among African states. 
irdly, while it is the responsibility of the RECs and individual countries to implement 
protocols and integrate policies, the AU Commission is still charged with monitoring that 
process. But the process remains slow despite the numerous eorts and working committees 
formed by the AU to coordinate the RECs. 
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ere are also problems in the China-Africa relationship itself complicating Beijing’s AU 
diplomacy. Firstly, despite its long involvement in the continent, with Chinese contacts going 
back to explorer Zheng He’s expeditions to the eastern coast of Africa from 1405 to 1433, it 
is only in the last 20 years that China has signicantly expanded its presence. For this reason, 
it may be considered a newcomer to the dynamics of the continent and to the roots of 
conict, as well as to peacekeeping and peacebuilding practices. Its limited knowledge on 
certain topics has at times constrained the eectiveness of its policies and led some to 
question its role as a responsible partner. Secondly, despite China’s claims of a leading role for 
itself, its staunch adherence to the norms of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference 
in others’ internal aairs have proved limiting. While adjustments to such principles have 
undoubtedly been witnessed, for instance in Beijing’s involvement in the peace process 
between Sudan and South Sudan, its reluctance to take positions on sensitive, often 
politicised issues threatens its readiness to fully engage with the complex issues the continent 
faces. Indeed, China’s mediation eorts, particularly in Sudan, have often been criticised as 
mostly driven by a desire to protect its economic interests. Finally, what Beijing expects from 
its eorts to cooperate with the AU seems to be a unitary, pan-African voice, which, as noted 
above, has been dicult to achieve. is contradicts and may even endanger China’s 
aspiration to transcend bilateral mechanisms and deepen multilateral cooperation. What 
often happens is that China ends up falling back on its tradition of using its strong ties with 
governing elites to strike deals more quickly and eciently. While this may be inevitable, 
given that Africa is a continent of over 50 states, many have questioned whether China even 
has a broad and comprehensive Africa strategy. 
THE WAY FORWARD.
e challenges of turning the China-AU relation into a successful one might be addressed in 
several ways. First, while Chinese eorts at mediation and its preference for high-level 
diplomatic exchanges may represent a good alternative to any active ‘interventionist’ attitude, 
such eorts need to be better integrated at both the multilateral and bilateral level. At the 
moment, the China-Africa partnership is essentially based on meetings and policies discussed 
at the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). More coordination is needed with AU 
representatives to avoid potential friction and to safeguard local agency: e China-AU 
strategic dialogues and the AU’s full membership in the Forum are rst steps in this direction. 
Second, better follow-up mechanisms need to be put in place if China is to be held 
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accountable for its nancial contributions to the AU Peace and Security Council. ird, 
trilateral cooperation with other external actors, such as the EU and the U.S. will be needed, 
especially in terms of sharing knowledge in the areas of peacebuilding and conict 
management. Recent years’ trends suggest that Beijing is more open to cooperating with 
Western actors, despite some dierences in their approaches to aid, development, and 
security. Fourth, China should use its position as a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council wisely, especially since the UN is the greatest contributor to peacekeeping forces on 
the continent, and since African countries are still underrepresented in international aairs. 
Leaders in Beijing should continue to use their inuence to promote increased multilateral 
cooperation between the UN and the AU. Finally, whilst the motto ‘African solutions for 
African problems’ underlines the importance of African agency in devising and 
implementing their own policies, this should not prevent constructive dialogue and exchange 
of ideas with external partners.
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